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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In two separate cases, forty-nine-year-old James Jason Ivie was placed on 
probation after pleading guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance. Later, 
Mr. Ivie admitted to violating his probation in both cases, and the district court eventually 
placed him back on probation. The State subsequently alleged that Mr. Ivie had again 
violated the terms of his probation. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court 
found that Mr. Ivie had violated the terms of his probation, and that some of those 
violations were willful. The district court then revoked Mr. Ivie's probation in both cases 
and executed the underlying sentences without any reduction. Later, the district court 
denied Mr. Ivie's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motions for a reduction 
of sentence. 
In this consolidated appeal, Mr. Ivie asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion when it revoked his probation, when it executed the underlying sentences 
without any reduction, and when it denied his Rule 35 motions. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
In Twin Falls County No. CR 2009-1756 (hereinafter, the 2009 case), Mr. Ivie 
pleaded guilty by way of an Alford plea 1 to possession of a controlled substance, felony, 
in violation of Idaho Code§ 37-2732(c)(1). (R., pp.86-92, 96-98, 102-03.) The district 
court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with four years fixed, and retained 
jurisdiction. (R., pp.104-09.) After Mr. Ivie successfully completed a "rider," the district 
1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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court suspended the sentence and placed him on probation for a period of three years. 
(R., pp.113, 115-21.) 
Mr. Ivie performed well on probation until his daughter was murdered, and he 
then relapsed. (See Tr., Apr. 26, 2013, p.61, Ls.10-12.) Soon after, in Twin Falls 
County No. CR 2011-3781 (hereinafter, the 2011 case), Mr. Ivie pleaded guilty to felony 
possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.162, 308-09, 344, 354-64.) Mr. Ivie also 
admitted to violating the terms of his probation in the 2009 case. (R., pp.162, 344.) In 
the 2009 case, the district court retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.162-68.) In the 2011 case, 
the district court imposed a consecutive unified sentence of three years, with one year 
fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.162-345-50.) After Mr. Ivie successfully 
completed a CAPP rider, the district court suspended the sentences in both cases and 
placed Mr. Ivie on concurrent four-year periods of probation. (R., pp.174-80, 381-87.) 
Later, Mr. Ivie relapsed again. (See Confidential Exs., p.1.) He then admitted to 
violating the terms of his probation in both cases. (R., pp.208, 414; see R., p.195.) 
After Mr. Ivie spent some time in jail, the district court suspended the sentences in both 
cases and placed Mr. Ivie on concurrent four-year periods of probation. (R., pp.216-23, 
422-29; see Confidential Exs., p.1.) As a special condition of probation, the district 
court ordered Mr. Ivie to 
apply to Mental Health Court and cooperate with the application process. 
If accepted, the defendant must successfully complete the program. If the 
defendant is not accepted, he shall develop an individual mental health 
program with his probation officer and shall complete that program. 
(R., pp.220, 426.) The district court also ordered Mr. Ivie to "comply with any direction 
as to his personal associations given to him by his probation officer or Mental Health 
Court staff." (R., pp.220, 426.) At the rider review hearing, the district court ordered 
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Mr. Ivie to not have contact with his wife, Ruth Ivie, because they had been using drugs 
together. (See Tr., Feb.15, 2013, p.45, Ls.4-18; see a/so Confidential Exs., p.1.) 
The district court also ordered Mr. Ivie to undergo a mental health court 
assessment. (R., pp.227-28, 435-36.) The mental health court subsequently denied his 
application. (Confidential Exs., pp.32-34.) 
After being released on probation, Mr. Ivie was ordered to live at a halfway 
house. (See Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.26, Ls.7-18; see a/so Confidential Exs., p.1.) 
Michael Smith, Mr. Ivie's probation officer, subsequently told Mr. Ivie that he could not 
have his wife serve as his payee for his Social Security benefits. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, 
p.26, L.23 - p.27, L.2.) However, Social Security would not give Mr. Ivie his benefits 
directly or let him make financial decisions for himself, and he had to go through his wife 
to get his bills paid or get money. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.27, Ls.17-25.) Because it was 
not possible for Mr. Ivie to be his own payee, he found himself unable to pay the 
$350.00 monthly rent for the halfway house, and he fell three months behind in his rent 
payments. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.27, Ls.2-8, 17-25.) As a result, Mr. Ivie agreed to pay 
the owner of the halfway house $400.00 a month in rent. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.25, 
Ls.8-13.) 
Mr. Ivie had a fixed income of $484.00 in net Social Security benefits per month, 
of which $400.00 went to rent, $25.00 to cost of supervision fees, and the rest to 
medications. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.28, L.15 - p.29, L.1.) Mr. Ivie was unable to take 
care of all of his financial obligations. (See Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.29, Ls.2-10.) For 
example, he was unable to pay for the urinalysis testing required by the terms of his 
probation, because he only had the funds to pay for his medications or for urinalysis 
testing, but not both. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.33, L.5 - p.35, L.4.) Either way, Mr. Ivie 
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would be in violation of his probation for not paying for the other. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, 
p.34, Ls.14-18.) In all, Mr. Ivie missed some twenty-five urinalysis tests. (Tr., Feb. 15, 
2013, p.11, Ls.20-21.) 
Mr. Smith later ordered Mr. Ivie to serve three days of discretionary jail time for 
unapproved contact with his wife. (See R., pp.246, 458.) Around this time, Mr. Ivie's 
wife went to a Social Security office on her own accord and "flipped the switch" so that 
Mr. Ivie could access his benefits. (See Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.34, Ls.3-6.) However, 
Mr. Ivie failed to get the paperwork required by Social Security to let him be his own 
payee. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.38, Ls.4-11.) Mr. Ivie's wife then had Mr. Ivie's Social 
Security benefits issued again in her name so that she could pay his bills. (Tr., Feb. 15, 
2013, p.38, Ls.14-16.) 
About two months later, Ronald Cantone, Psy.D. at Psychiatric Services, BHC in 
Twin Falls completed a Comprehensive Diagnostic Assessment of Mr. Ivie. 
(Confidential Exs., pp.1-4.) Mr. Smith later testified that Mr. Ivie "may have" brought the 
assessment to one of their meetings, and that he "discussed" the assessment's findings 
with Mr. Ivie. (See Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.20, Ls.4-7, p.21, Ls.10-17.) Dr. Cantone 
diagnosed Mr. Ivie with "Bipolar I Disorder, most recent depressed, severe; PTSD; 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder; Agoraphobia with panic; Dissociative Identity Disorder; 
ADHD Combined Type." (Confidential Exs., p.4.) Mr. Ivie's prescription medications at 
the time were "Lamictal, Zoloft, Clonazapam, Buspar, Remeron, Zalephon." 
(Confidential Exs., p.4.) Dr. Cantone reported that Mr. Ivie's no-contact order with his 
wife "has been extremely hard for him to handle and has triggered feelings of 
abandonment which has only exacerbated his extreme anxiety and fears." (Confidential 
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Exs., p.1.) Mr. Ivie "continues to lose blocks of time. He can be somewhere and not 
know how he got there." (Confidential Exs., p.2.) 
Dr. Cantone also wrote that Mr. Ivie 
is trying to cope with these different conditions and is trying his best to 
follow his treatment plan with his therapist. He has a[n] overwhelming fear 
of going back to prison and is afraid that he'll screw up. His anxiety is 
extreme. His panic disorder and his fear of being in public [are] also 
extreme. His current medications are helping a little but he needs time to 
overcome his fears and panic. He is at present unable to function in 
public. If forced to do so it could push him into a near-psychotic state. 
(Confidential Exs., p.2.) 
Sandra Hunt, LMSW, at Psychiatric Services also addressed a letter to 
Mr. Smith. (Confidential Exs., pp.5-6.) Mr. Ivie showed the letter to Mr. Smith during 
one of their meetings. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.19, L.11 - p.20, L.3.) Ms. Hunt reported 
that Mr. Ivie "continues to expierence daily emotional distress." (Confidential Exs., p.5.) 
She further wrote that Mr. Ivie's "current mental health symptoms are severe and he 
was recently prescribed medications to manage debilitating anxiety episodes. However, 
he still does not have means of transportation and his separation from his wife has 
increased his level of emotional distress." (Confidential Exs., p.5.) Mr. Ivie had difficulty 
seeking employment because of his "[l]ack of appropriate social skills combined with 
severe mental health symptoms," and he was also experiencing "depression due to the 
'loss' of his wife." (Confidential Exs., p.5.) According to Ms. Hunt, "The prohibition of 
living w/ his wife has been very difficult for James. He does not have a healthy support 
system and the loss of his biggest supporter has been overwhelming for James." 
(Confidential Exs., p.5.) 
Ms. Hunt wrote that Mr. Ivie had made progress in his ability to appropriately 
process situations, but "the progression of change has been and will continue to be 
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gradual. Improved change also depends on accessibility to community services and on 
his ability to manage mental health symptoms." (Confidential Exs., p.6.) "Additionally, 
the fewer stressors he encounters during the relearning phase the better chance he will 
have to maintain his recovery from substance use and obtain mental/emotional 
stability." (Confidential Exs., p.6 (emphasis in original).) 
Mr. Smith was aware that Mr. Ivie had some limitations due to his mental health 
issues. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.21, Ls.5-9.) Despite this awareness, Mr. Smith treated 
Mr. Ivie like any other probationer under his supervision and ordered him to conduct a 
job search with eight job contacts a day. (See Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.9, L.10-p.10, L.5.) 
When Mr. Ivie did not conduct a job search, Mr. Smith then ordered Mr. Ivie to go 
to vocational rehabilitation and apply for employment, even though that would require 
Mr. Ivie to be out in public. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p. 9, Ls.4-14, p.10, Ls.9-17, p.21, Ls.18-
22.) Mr. Smith later testified that "Mr. Ivie has documented mental health issues, and I 
felt that by sending him to vocational rehabilitation, they would be the best place to get 
help in obtaining employment .... " (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.10, Ls.12-14.) But Mr. Smith 
had also been aware that the correspondence from Psychiatric Services stated that 
Mr. Ivie had panic disorder, an extreme fear of being in public and extreme anxiety, and 
that he was unable to function in public and forcing him to do so would push him into a 
near-psychotic state. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.21, Ls.10-17.) Thus, after attending the 
vocational rehabilitation orientation, Mr. Ivie reportedly made several negative 
comments and ripped up a phone book in the vocational rehabilitation lobby. (See 
R., p.446; Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.10, Ls.18-23.) Mr. Ivie stated that he ripped the phone 
book to deal with his anxiety. (R., p.446.) People in rider programs are taught to take 
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aggression out on inanimate objects, rather than individuals, if they have to. (See 
Tr., Apr. 26, 2013, p.57, Ls.14-16.) 
Mr. Smith ordered Mr. Ivie to serve fifteen days of discretionary jail time for 
ripping the phone book. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.10, L.24 - p.11, L.14.) However, 
Mr. Smith did not make any arrangements for Mr. Ivie to have access to any of his 
mental health medications while Mr. Ivie was incarcerated. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.23, 
Ls.4-10.) Mr. Ivie went to the jail without being able to get his medications. 
(Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.36, Ls.13-15.) During the time he was incarcerated, Mr. Ivie was 
not given any of his prescription medications. (R., p.494.) After his release from jail, 
Mr. Ivie found that his medications at the halfway house were gone. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, 
p.31, Ls.13-16.) 
Once he came out of jail while unmedicated, Mr. Ivie was ordered to go to ninety 
meetings in ninety days. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.36, Ls.17-18.) Between those meetings 
and his urinalysis tests, Mr. Ivie would have had to be in public up to three times a day 
in the presence of dozens of people. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.36, Ls.20-24.) 
Mr. Ivie relapsed again following his release from the discretionary jail time. 
(Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.36, Ls.6-9; see R., pp.244, 251.) After spending over two weeks 
in jail unmedicated, he was suffering from withdrawals from his medications, and from 
the mental health issues the medications were designed to treat. (R., p.495.) Mr. Ivie 
signed a written admission to using methamphetamine and marijuana after his release, 
and another written admission to consuming alcohol after his release. (R., pp.251, 463; 
Tr., Feb.15, 2013, p.13, L.20-p.14, L.16.) 
The State then filed an Ex Parte Motion to Revoke Probation and Issue a 
Warrant, alleging that Mr. Ivie had violated the terms of his probation by (1) failing to 
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seek and maintain gainful employment, (2) using methamphetamine and marijuana, (3) 
failing to pay owed cost of supervision fees in the amount of $150.00, (4) having 
unapproved contact with his wife, Ruth Ivie, (5) failing to report for substance abuse 
testing some twenty-five times, and (6) consuming alcohol. (R., pp.243-44, 455-56; see 
R., pp.129, 245-47, 457-59.) Mr. Ivie initially entered denials to the alleged probation 
violations. (R., pp.258, 470.) 
At the evidentiary hearing, the district court heard testimony from Mr. Smith and 
from Mr. Ivie. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.6, L.11 - p.25, L.11 (Mr. Smith), p.25, L.20 - p.39, 
L.3 (Mr. Ivie).) Following that testimony and argument from the parties, the district court 
found that Mr. Ivie had violated his probation. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.44, L.3 - p.46, L.7.) 
Specifically, the district court found that Mr. Ivie had violated his probation by failing to 
maintain full-time employment, failing to pay the supervision fees, and failing to take 
urinalysis tests, but those violations were not willful. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.44, Ls.3-14, 
17-21, p.45, L.23 - p.46, L.3.) However the district court also expressly found that 
Mr. Ivie had willfully violated his probation by having unsupervised contact with his wife 
and by consuming alcohol. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.44, L.22 - p.45, L.22, p.46, Ls.4-7.) 
Additionally, the district court found that Mr. Ivie had violated his probation by using 
methamphetamine and marijuana, but did not make an express finding as to whether 
that violation was willful or not. (See Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.44, Ls.15-17.) 
The district court then ordered, over the State's objection, that Mr. Ivie be 
reevaluated for mental health court. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.46, L.18 - p.48, L.3, p.50, 
Ls.6-23.) The district court, after stating that it "continue[s] to be frustrated with the Twin 
Falls County jail system for failing to medicate[] people that have different medical 
needs," also ordered the Twin Falls County sheriff to evaluate Mr. Ivie to determine 
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whether he needed to be on his medication, and if so, to put him on his medication. 
(Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.48, Ls.8-18.) 
After Mr. Ivie's mental health court reevaluation, the mental health court 
coordinator denied his application to participate in mental health court, because "Mr. Ivie 
indicated he is not interested in participating in Mental Health Court and stated he is 
being forced to apply. This would decrease his chances of success significantly." 
(Confidential Exs., pp.51-52.) 
At the subsequent disposition hearing, the State recommended that the district 
court revoke probation and execute the underlying sentences. (Tr., Apr. 26, 2013, p.54, 
Ls.17-19.) Mr. Ivie recommended that the district court place him back on probation. 
(Tr., Apr. 26, 2013, p.57, Ls.1-3.) The district court, after reiterating that it found that 
Mr. Ivie had willfully violated his probation, revoked probation and executed the 
underlying sentences in both cases. (R., pp.275-80, 487-92; Tr., Apr. 26, 2013, p.65, 
Ls.11-18.) The district court declined to exercise its authority to reduce the sentences 
sua sponte. (Tr., Apr. 26, 2013, p.65, Ls.19-23.) In the order revoking probation for 
each case, the district court ordered Mr. Ivie to pay all outstanding court costs, fines, 
and restitution. (R., pp.278, 490.) 
The district court clerk then filed an Affidavit and Notice of Failure to Pay in each 
case. (R., pp.281, 493.) In the 2009 case, Mr. Ivie had a balance due of $1916.44. 
(R., p.281.) In the 2011 case, Mr. Ivie had a balance due of $755.34. (R., p.493.) The 
affidavits advised that, if the monies owed were not paid in full one month from the date 
of the affidavits, "pursuant to statute, a collection agency will seek to collect any 
unpaid monies and will charge an additional 33% of the money owed as a collection 
fee." (R., pp.281, 493 (emphases in original).) 
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Mr. Ivie later filed Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motions for reconsideration of sentence 
in both cases. (R., pp.282-84, 494-96.) The Rule 35 motions stated that, "While 
Mr. Ivie understands why he was incarcerated, he asserts that it was not his choice to 
discontinue the use of his prescription medication." (R., pp.283, 495.) Mr. Ivie 
asserted "that he can complete probation if he is allowed to receive uninterrupted 
treatment from his physicians." (R., pp.283, 495.) Thus, he requested that the district 
court reconsider the execution of his sentences. (R., pp.283, 495.) Alternatively, 
Mr. Ivie "requested that the payment of all moneys owed to the court be delayed to a 
time after he has been released on parole, so that he may actually be able to pay those 
moneys." (R., pp.283, 495.) He requested oral argument on the Rule 35 motions. 
(R., pp.283, 495.) 
The district court then denied Mr. Ivie's Rule 35 motions without conducting a 
hearing. (R., pp.285-88, 497-500.) In the orders denying the Rule 35 motions, the 
district court explained that it understood Mr. Ivie's concerns with being denied his 
medications while serving discretionary jail time and being released without the benefit 
of being medicated. (R., pp.287, 499.) The district court then stated, "The Court is not 
imposing Mr. Ivie's sentence based on his mental health issues but instead, based on 
his inability to comply with the terms of probation." (R., pp.287, 499.) "The Court is 
aware of Mr. Ivie's difficulties but does not find they are a sufficient reason to reduce a 
legally imposed sentence." (R., pp.287, 499.) 
The district court also ruled that it would "not provide Mr. Ivie with an extension 
on his deadline to pay his outstanding financial obligations in this matter. The 
defendant has been aware of his obligations for quite some time and the Court will not 
prevent the County from turning his account over to collections at this time." 
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(R., pp.287, 499.) Thus, the district court denied the Rule 35 motions. (R., pp.287, 
499.) 
Mr. Ivie filed timely Notices of Appeal in both cases. (R., pp.289-92, 501-04.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court issued an order consolidating the appeals. (R., pp.298, 510.) 
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ISSUES 
1 Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Ivie's probation? 
2. Did the district court, when it revoked Mr. Ivie's probation, abuse its discretion by 
executing the underlying sentences without any reduction? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Ivie's Idaho Criminal 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Ivie's Probation 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Ivie asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his 
probation. The district court revoked Mr. Ivie's probation after finding that he committed 
willful violations of his probation. However, there was insufficient evidence to support 
the district court's finding that Mr. Ivie willfully violated his probation. Because Idaho 
Criminal Rule 33(e) authorizes a district court to revoke probation only for willful 
violations, the district court abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Ivie's probation 
because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards. Alternatively, 
even if the district court correctly determined that Mr. Ivie willfully violated his probation, 
the district court still abused its discretion when it revoked his probation, because it 
could only reasonably conclude from Mr. Ivie's conduct that probation was achieving its 
rehabilitative purpose. 
B. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law 
A district court is empowered by statute to revoke a defendant's probation under 
certain circumstances. I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 & 20-222. "A district court's decision 
to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the court 
abused its discretion." State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). In reviewing a 
district court's discretionary decision, appellate courts conduct an inquiry "to determine 
whether the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the 
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boundaries of such discretion and consistently with the applicable legal standards, and 
reached its standards by an exercise of reason." Id. 
Appellate courts use a two-step analysis in reviewing a probation revocation 
proceeding. Id. First, the appellate court determines "whether the defendant violated 
the terms of his probation." Id. "If it is determined that the defendant has in fact violated 
the terms of his probation, the second question is what should be the consequences of 
that violation." Id. 
Mr. Ivie concedes that he admitted to violating his probation by using 
methamphetamine and marijuana, and by consuming alcohol. (See R., pp.251, 463; 
Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.44, Ls.15-17, p.46, Ls.4-5.) When a probationer admits to a direct 
violation of his probation agreement, no further inquiry into the question is required. 
State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 50 (Ct. App. 1992). Thus, this Court may go to the 
second step of the analysis and determine whether the district court abused its 
discretion when it revoked Mr. Ivie's probation. 
The legal standard a district court must use to determine whether to revoke 
probation depends on whether the violation was willful or non-willful. Id. "If a knowing 
and intentional probation violation has been proved, a district court's decision to revoke 
probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Id. (quoting State v. Leach, 135 
Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001)). 
Before the recent amendment to Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e), the standard for 
revoking a non-willful probation violation was, "if a probationer's violation of a probation 
condition was not willful, or was beyond the probationer's control, a court may not 
revoke probation and order imprisonment without first considering alternative methods 
to address the violation." See id. (quoting Leach, 135 Idaho at 529). 
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However, the current version of Rule 33(e) states: "The court shall not revoke 
probation unless there is an admission by the defendant or a finding by the court, 
following a hearing, that the defendant willfully violated a condition of probation." 
I.C.R. 33(e) (emphasis added). Because the current version of Rule 33(e) uses the 
language "shall not," the restriction it imposes is mandatory. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 
137 Idaho 758, 760 (2002) (quoting Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848 (1995)). Thus, if a 
violation of a condition of probation is non-willful, a district court may not revoke 
probation. See I.C.R. 33(e). 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Ivie's Probation 
Because It Did Not Act Consistently With The Applicable Legal Standards 
Mr. Ivie asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his 
probation, because the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal 
standards. There was insufficient evidence to support the district court's finding that 
Mr. Ivie willfully violated his probation. The district court therefore revoked Mr. Ivie's 
probation for non-willful violations. However, Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e) permitted the 
district court to revoke probation only for willful violations. Thus, the district court did not 
act consistently with the applicable legal standards when it revoked Mr. Ivie's probation. 
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Ivie submits that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the district court's finding that he willfully violated his probation. "A trial court's 
finding of a probation violation will be upheld on appeal if there is substantial evidence 
in the record to support the finding." Leach, 135 Idaho at 530. Substantial evidence 
does not support the district court's findings that Mr. Ivie willfully violated his probation 
by having unsupervised contact with his wife, by consuming alcohol, or by using 
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methamphetamine and marijuana (assuming, without conceding, that the district court 
found that the drug use violation was willful). 
While Idaho's appellate courts have not yet interpreted the current version of 
Rule 33(e), Idaho case law from before the effective date of the Rule's amendment 
indicates that a probation violation is non-willful where the probationer was not at fault 
or had no control over the violation. See, e.g., Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 441 
(Ct. App. 2007) (holding, in an appeal from a summary dismissal of a post-conviction 
petition, that a neuropsychological evaluation called into question whether a 
probationer's probation violations were willful because the evaluation indicated that the 
probationer's unmedicated mental health problems likely played a substantial role in his 
probation violations); State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 380 (Ct. App. 1994), (holding that the 
record was insufficient to show that a probationer willfully violated his probation, where 
the probationer, who was certified as one-hundred percent disabled, was involuntarily 
terminated from a halfway house program because he was unable to perform the 
carpentry work required as part of the program). 
Conversely, Idaho's appellate courts have held that a probation violation is willful 
where the probationer is responsible or at fault for the violation. See, e.g., State v. Fife, 
114 Idaho 103, 104-06 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the record supported the district 
court's finding of a willful probation violation, where firearms were found at a 
probationer's home after the probationer was informed he could not possess firearms 
and he indicated that he understood that condition). 
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1. There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support The District Court's Finding 
That Mr. Ivie Willfully Violated His Probation By Using Drugs Or By 
Consuming Alcohol 
There was insufficient evidence to support the district court's finding that Mr. Ivie 
willfully violated his probation by using methamphetamine and marijuana, or by 
consuming alcohol. Although Mr. Ivie admitted to using drugs and consuming alcohol, 
he had not been properly medicated before and during those acts. (See Tr., Feb. 15, 
2013, Ls.6-13.) The drug use and alcohol consumption occurred after Mr. Ivie spent 
over two weeks serving discretionary jail time without his mental health medications. 
(See R., pp.251, 463; Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.31, Ls.10-15, p.36, Ls.13-15.) 
Additionally, the district court itself mentioned, when it ordered that the jail 
evaluate Mr. Ivie for mental health medications, that it had been aware that the jail was 
not properly medicating inmates. The district court stated, "I . . . continue to be 
frustrated with the Twin Falls County jail system for failing to medicate[] people that 
have different medical needs." (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.48, Ls.8-11.) Thus, the district 
court ordered the Twin Falls County Sheriff to evaluate Mr. Ivie "to determine whether 
he needs to be on his medication that he's been on for years. And if he is, then I'm 
ordering the sheriff to put him on it. Period. End of discussion." (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, 
p.48, Ls.11-18.) The district court's awareness that the jail was not properly medicating 
inmates further indicates that Mr. Ivie was not properly medicated before he used drugs 
and consumed alcohol. 
Also, after Mr. Ivie came out of jail unmedicated, Mr. Smith ordered Mr. Ivie to 
attend ninety meetings in ninety days, and thus required to be in public up to three times 
a day in the presence of potentially dozens of people. (See Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.36, 
Ls.16-24.) This order flew in the face of Dr. Cantone's warning that, because Mr. Ivie 
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suffers from serious anxiety and panic issues, forcing him to be in public "could push 
him into a near-psychotic state." (See Confidential Exs., p.2.) Mr. Ivie's special 
conditions of probation included the provision that, were he not accepted into mental 
health court, he would "develop an individual mental health program with his probation 
officer and shall complete that program." (R., p.220.) Mr. Smith acknowledged the 
existence of this special condition at the evidentiary hearing, and did not violate Mr. Ivie 
for that special condition because "[h]e was going through Psychiatric Services." (See 
Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.24, Ls.9-20.) However, Mr. Ivie submits that it was impossible for 
him to "complete [his individual mental health] program" with Mr. Smith, because the 
orders of his probation officer utterly contradicted the assessments and 
recommendations of his mental health caregivers. 2 
Considering that Mr. Ivie was off his medications, and that he was required to be 
in public despite his extreme anxiety and panic attacks (and against the advice of his 
mental health caregivers), his drug use and alcohol consumption was not willful. See 
Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 441; Lafferty, 125 Idaho at 382. Mr. Ivie was not at fault for the 
drug use and alcohol consumption, because he was using drugs and consuming alcohol 
to cope with being off his mental health medications and being forced to go into public 
multiple times a day. (See Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.36, Ls.12-25.) 
Mr. Ivie's situation with respect to the drug use and alcohol consumption 
violations is similar to that of the defendant in Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 441. In Knutsen, 
2 Alongside the many problems discussed above, there were other deficiencies with 
Mr. Smith's handling of Mr. Ivie's mental health issues. For example, although Mr. Ivie 
showed Mr. Smith a copy of the Psychiatric Services letter from Ms. Hunt (see Tr., Feb. 
15, 2013, p.19, Ls.22-23), Mr. Smith did not retain a copy of the letter for Mr. Ivie's file, 
apparently because "it was not mailed directly to me." (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.19, Ls.23-
25.) 
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the Court concluded that the defendant's unmedicated mental health issues raised the 
possibility that his probation violations were not willful. Id. Like the record in Knutsen, 
the record here indicates that Mr. Ivie's unmedicated mental health problems likely 
played a substantial role in his drug use and alcohol consumption probation violations 
following his discretionary jail time, and that those violations were therefore not willful. 
See id. Thus, there was insufficient evidence to support the district court's finding that 
Mr. Ivie willfully violated his probation by using methamphetamine and marijuana, or by 
consuming alcohol. 
2. There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support The District Court's Finding 
That Mr. Ivie Willfully Violated His Probation By Having Unsupervised 
Contact With His Wife 
Additionally, there was insufficient evidence to support the district court's finding 
that Mr. Ivie willfully violated his probation by having unsupervised contact with his wife. 
The district court hinted at the lack of evidence when it concluded that Mr. Ivie willfully 
violated his probation by contacting his wife, because it stated, "I don't know what the 
justification was this time, nobody explained that in the record .... " (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, 
p.45, Ls.18-22.) 
As Mr. Ivie explained, he tried but failed to file the paperwork to have Social 
Security make him his own payee and issue his checks in his name, so his wife had his 
checks issued in her name so she could help with his financial obligations. 
(Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.38, Ls.3-23.) The record indicates that, because of Mr. Ivie's 
precarious financial position and the fact that his wife remained his sole source of 
income despite his best efforts, he may have contacted his wife to have her pay some 
of his financial obligations. Mr. Ivie would hardly have been at fault for violating his 
probation to contact his wife for that reason, because had he not contacted his wife to 
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have her pay his financial obligations (such as bills for the medications required to 
follow the mental health plan special condition of his probation), he would have been in 
violation of his probation for that failure to pay. (See Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.34, Ls.14-18.) 
The record here does not contain any evidence, much less any substantial 
evidence, indicating that there was another reason for Mr. Ivie's contact with his wife. 
For example, the underlying probation violation report only stated that Mr. Ivie "had 
unapproved contact with Ruth Ivie" and that he "was at Ruth Ivie's residence," without 
reporting why Mr. Ivie had contacted his wife. (See R., p.246.) Additionally, because 
Mr. Ivie "continues to lose blocks of time" and "can be somewhere and not know how he 
got there" (see Confidential Exs., p.2), it could have been the case that Mr. Ivie 
contacted his wife or was at her residence without knowing how he got there. Thus, 
there was insufficient evidence to support the district court's finding that Mr. Ivie willfully 
violated his probation by having unsupervised contact with his wife. 
As shown above, there was insufficient evidence to support the district court's 
finding that Mr. Ivie willfully violated his probation. Thus, the district court revoked 
Mr. Ivie's probation for non-willful violations. However, Rule 33(e) permitted the district 
court to revoke probation only for a willful violation of a condition of probation. Thus, the 
district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards when it revoked 
probation. Because the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal 
standards, it abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Ivie's probation. 
D. Alternatively, The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Ivie's 
Probation Because It Could Only Reasonably Conclude From Mr. Ivie's Conduct 
That Probation Was Achieving Its Rehabilitative Purpose 
Alternatively, Mr. Ivie asserts that, even if the district court correctly determined 
that Mr. Ivie had willfully violated his probation, the district court still abused its 
20 
discretion when it revoked his probation because it could only reasonably conclude from 
Mr. Ivie's conduct that probation was achieving its rehabilitative purpose. 
As discussed above, "If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been 
proved, a district court's decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion." Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105 (quoting Leach, 135 Idaho at 529). However, 
probation may not be revoked arbitrarily. State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055 
(Ct. App. 1989). The purpose of probation is to provide an opportunity to be 
rehabilitated under proper control and supervision. State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 50 
(Ct. App. 1992). Thus, in determining whether to revoke probation, a court must 
consider whether probation is meeting the objective of rehabilitation while also providing 
adequate protection for society. State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995). 
The district court may revoke probation if it reasonably concludes from the defendant's 
conduct that probation is not achieving its rehabilitative purpose. Adams, 114 Idaho at 
1055. The district court may consider the defendant's conduct both before and during 
the probationary period. State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Assuming, without conceding, that the district court correctly determined that 
some of Mr. Ivie's probation violations were willful, the district court nonetheless abused 
its discretion when it revoked his probation because it could only reasonably conclude 
from Mr. Ivie's conduct that probation was achieving its rehabilitative purpose. At the 
disposition hearing, the district court stated, "This is not a case where rehabilitation has 
been looked at and ignored. We have given to you every reasonable opportunity to stay 
clean in this society. You have decided for whatever reason that that's what you're 
going to do to solve your problems, to continue using drugs." (Tr., Apr. 26, 2013, p.64, 
Ls.14-20.) The district court later told Mr. Ivie that "your counsel tells me that you're in 
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jail, and you are doing better because you're in jail, and you are doing better because 
you're medicated tells me that you weren't paying attention to what you should have 
been doing when you were on probation to begin with .... " (Tr., Apr. 26, 2013, p.65, 
Ls.5-9.) The district court then concluded, "Probation has not served its intended 
purposes." (Tr., Apr. 26, 2013, p.65, L.13.) 
Mr. Ivie asserts that the district court could not have reasonably reached this 
conclusion based on his conduct. Although the district court essentially told Mr. Ivie that 
he went off his medications because "you weren't paying attention to what you should 
have been doing when you were on probation to begin with" (see Tr., Apr. 26, 2013, 
p.65, Ls. 7-9), Mr. Ivie actually went unmedicated because his probation officer, 
Mr. Smith, gave him over two weeks of discretionary jail time without allowing Mr. Ivie to 
get his proper medications. (See Tr., Apr. 26, 2013, p.57, Ls. 17-19, p.57, L.24 - p.58, 
L.2.) As discussed above, Mr. Ivie relapsed into drug use and alcohol consumption only 
after he went unmedicated during his discretionary jail time, in an attempt to "control his 
demons." (See Tr., Apr. 26, 2013, p.58, Ls.10-12.) Before he went unmedicated thanks 
to Mr. Smith ordering discretionary jail time, Mr. Ivie had been "trying his best to follow 
his treatment plan with his therapist." (See Confidential Exs., p.2.) 
The district court could only reasonably conclude from Mr. Ivie's conduct that 
probation was achieving its rehabilitative purpose. As explained above, Mr. Ivie's 
violations found to be willful by the district court were precipitated by Mr. Smith ordering 
Mr. Ivie to serve discretionary jail time without his mental health medications and 
forbidding Mr. Ivie to contact his wife despite her being his sole source of income to pay 
his financial obligations. Under the circumstances of this case, those violations fail to 
demonstrate that Mr. Ivie was not being rehabilitated. Thus, the district court could only 
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reasonably conclude from Mr. Ivie's conduct that probation was achieving its 
rehabilitative purpose. By revoking his probation, the district court abused its discretion. 
II. 
The District Court, When It Revoked Mr. Ivie's Probation, Abused Its Discretion By 
Executing His Underlying Sentences Without Any Reduction 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Ivie asserts that when the district court revoked his probation, it abused its 
discretion by executing his underlying sentences without any reduction. The district 
court abused its discretion because the underlying sentences are excessive under any 
reasonable view of the facts. 
B. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law 
"When a trial court revokes a defendant's probation, the court possesses 
authority under I.C.R. 35 to sua sponte reduce the sentence. The decision whether to 
do so is committed to the discretion of the court." State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 672 
(Ct. App. 1998). The district court here acknowledged that it had this authority, but 
declined to exercise it. (Tr., Apr. 26, 2013, p.65, Ls.19-23.) 
"A sentence is reviewed by [an appellate court] for an abuse of discretion. The 
reasonableness of a term of imprisonment must be measured against the sentencing 
goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution." State v. Chavez, 
134 Idaho 308, 314 (Ct. App. 2000) (citation omitted). When reviewing an excessive 
sentence claim, appellate courts "conduct an independent review of the record, focusing 
on the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." Id. Review of a 
sentence executed after the revocation of probation is not based "upon the facts 
existing when the sentence was imposed. Rather, [appellate courts] examine all the 
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circumstances bearing upon the decision to revoke probation and execute the sentence, 
including events that occurred between the original pronouncement of the sentence and 
the revocation of probation." Id. "A sentence will not be reduced on appeal unless it is 
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts." Id. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion Because The Underlying Sentences Are 
Excessive Under Any Reasonable View Of The Facts 
Mr. Ivie submits that the district court abused its discretion because his 
underlying sentences (the unified sentence of seven years, with four years fixed, in the 
2009 case, and the consecutive unified sentence of three years, with one year fixed, in 
the 2011 case) are excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. 
The sentences are excessive under any reasonable view of the facts because 
the district court did not adequately consider mitigating factors. Specifically, the district 
court did not adequately consider Mr. Ivie's mental condition. As discussed above, 
Mr. Ivie has serious mental health issues. Dr. Cantone, in the Comprehensive 
Diagnostic Assessment, diagnosed Mr. Ivie with "Bipolar I Disorder, most recent 
depressed, severe; PTSD; Generalized Anxiety Disorder; Agoraphobia with panic; 
Dissociative Identity Disorder; [and] ADHD Combined Type." (Confidential Exs., pp.1-
4.) Mr. Ivie "has a history of severe depression and mood swings, anxiety and [PTSD] 
since childhood. (Confidential Exs., p.1.) Dr. Cantone characterized the killing of 
Mr. Ivie's daughter as sending Mr. Ivie "into a tailspin." (Confidential Exs., p.1.) 
Mr. Ivie's symptoms during the depressed stages of his bipolar disorder included, 
"Extreme sadness, no energy, fear, no interest, no motivation, decreased appetite, 
hopless[ness], helpless[ness], [and] worthless[ness]." (Confidential Exs., pp.1-2.) He 
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additionally experienced manic episodes lasting several days to over one week as part 
of his bipolar disorder, but those were becoming less frequent. (Confidential Exs., p.2.) 
Dr. Cantone also described Mr. Ivie as suffering from the following symptoms of 
PTSD: "Nightmares, intrusive thoughts, flashback, extreme distress at cues that remind 
him of the abuse he suffered, re-lives the traumas, easily frustrated, hypervigilance, 
easily startled, easily angered." (Confidential Exs., p.2.) His anxiety made him "[v]ery 
tense, on edge, [and with] excessive worry," and Mr. Ivie had several panic attacks a 
day involving increased heart rate, inability to breathe, and nausea. (Confidential Exs., 
p.2.) Additionally, Mr. Ivie continued "to lose blocks of time. He can be somewhere 
and not know how he got there." (Confidential Exs., p.2.) 
Dr. Cantone further stated that Mr. Ivie "has an intense fear of being in public 
where there are lots of people. He gets panic attacks and vomits if there are too many 
people." (Confidential Exs., p.2.) Dr. Cantone concluded that Mr. Ivie "is at present 
unable to function in public. If forced to do so it could push him into a near-psychotic 
state." (Confidential Exs., p.2.) 
The district court acknowledged that Mr. Ivie has "significant mental health 
issues." (Tr., Apr. 26, 2013, p.63, L.21.) However, adequate consideration of Mr. Ivie's 
mental condition should have resulted in lesser sentences. 
The district court also did not adequately consider Mr. Ivie's difficult childhood. 
Dr. Cantone reported that Mr. Ivie's mother died when he was four years old. 
(Confidential Exs., p.1.) In an earlier mental health assessment, Mr. Ivie stated that his 
mother died of a heart attack while she was at a bar, and that he was at the bar when 
his mother died. (Confidential Exs., p.36.) 
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Between the ages of four and eight, Mr. Ivie was placed in thirteen foster homes. 
(Confidential Exs., p.1.) Dr. Cantone wrote, "In those homes he was severely and 
extremely physically and sexually abused." (Confidential Exs., p.1.) At the age of four, 
Mr. Ivie was given LSD at one of the foster homes. (Confidential Exs., p.1.) When he 
was five years old, his head was bashed in and he was thrown in a dumpster. 
(Confidential Exs., p.36.) In another foster home, at the age of six, Mr. Ivie was 
abandoned in a garage for three days with no food or water. (Confidential Exs., p.1.) 
The foster family had moved without him, and he was found by an animal protection 
officer. (Confidential Exs., p.1.) 
When he was eight years old, Mr. Ivie was adopted, but he described it as being 
adopted "into slavery." (Confidential Exs., p.1.) His adoptive parents were extremely 
physically and emotionally abusive, and he reported being beaten, stabbed, and 
otherwise tortured. (Confidential Exs., p.1.) Mr. Ivie was hospitalized when he was 
eleven years old for acting out behaviors, and he left home when he was fifteen. 
(Confidential Exs., p.1.) 
At the disposition hearing, the district court told Mr. Ivie, "You had a terrible 
upbringing. I have no doubt about that." (Tr., Apr. 26, 2013, p.63, L.25 - p.64, L.1.) 
However, adequate consideration of Mr. Ivie's difficult childhood should have resulted in 
lesser sentences. 
The district court also did not adequately consider that Mr. Ivie's forced 
separation from his wife has only worsened his problems. Dr. Cantone wrote that the 
no-contact order "has been extremely hard for [Mr. Ivie] to handle and has triggered 
feelings of abandonment which has only exacerbated his extreme anxiety and fears." 
(Confidential Exs., p.1.) Ms. Hunt, in her letter to Mr. Smith, wrote that Mr. Ivie 
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"experiences depression due to the 'loss' of his wife. The prohibition of living w/ his wife 
has been very difficult for [Mr. Ivie]. He does not have a healthy social support system 
and the loss of his biggest supporter has been overwhelming." (Confidential Exs., p.5.) 
At the disposition hearing, the district court told Mr. Ivie that the no-contact order 
was justified because both Mr. Ivie and his wife had been using drugs and facilitating 
each other. (Tr., Apr. 26, 2013, p.64, Ls.21-24.) Despite the district court's statement, 
the documents from Dr. Cantone and Ms. Hunt show that the no-contact order has 
exacerbated Mr. Ivie's mental health issues and other difficulties. Adequate 
consideration of the fact that Mr. Ivie's forced separation from his wife has only 
worsened his problems should have led to lesser sentences. 
Because the district court did not adequately consider the above mitigating 
factors, the sentences executed by the district court are excessive considering any view 
of the facts. Thus, the district court, when it revoked Mr. Ivie's probation, abused its 
discretion when it executed the underlying sentences without any reduction. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Ivie's Idaho Criminal Rule 
35 Motions For A Reduction Of Sentence 
A Introduction 
Mr. Ivie asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
Rule 35 motions for a reduction of sentence. The district court abused its discretion 
because Mr. Ivie's sentences are excessive in view of new and additional information 
presented with the motions for reduction. Alternatively, the district court abused its 
discretion when it denied Mr. Ivie's request for an extension of time to pay the balances 
owed, because the denial was not predicated on sound reasoning. 
27 
B. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law 
"A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to 
the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which 
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe." State v. Trent, 
125 Idaho 251,253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted). "The denial of a motion for 
modification of a sentence will not be disturbed absent a showing that the court abused 
its discretion." Id. "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency 
are the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was 
reasonable." Id. "If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the defendant 
must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional information presented 
with the motion for reduction." Id. 
At issue here is not only the severity of the sentences per se, but also "the 
manner by which the district court arrived at ... the denial of the Rule 35 motion[s]." 
See State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 822 (Ct. App. 2008). As discussed above, "On 
appeal an abuse of discretion may be found if the trial court did not perceive the issue 
as one of discretion, or did not act within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any applicable legal standards, or did not reach its decision by an 
exercise of reason." Id. at 822-23 (citing State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 568 (2007); 
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)). "If the trial court acted irrationally, an 
abuse of discretion will be found." Id. (citing State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 
345 (2005)). 
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C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion, Because Mr. Ivie's Sentences Are 
Excessive In View Of New And Additional Information Presented With The 
Motions For Reduction 
Mr. Ivie asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
Rule 35 motions, because his sentences are excessive in view of new and additional 
information presented with the motions for reduction. Specifically, Mr. Ivie presented 
new and additional information on his mental health issues and his lack of proper 
medication while serving the discretionary jail time in November and December of 2012. 
Mr. Ivie stated that, after being unmedicated for over two weeks and then released, he 
was suffering withdrawals from the medication and from the mental issues the 
medications were designed to treat. (R., pp.283, 495.) Thus, he asserted "that it was 
not his choice to discontinue the use of his prescription medication," and that "he can 
complete probation if he is allowed to receive uninterrupted treatment from his 
physicians." (R., pp.283, 495.) 
The above new and additional information on Mr. Ivie's mental health issues and 
lack of proper medication shows that his sentences are excessive. This information 
further emphasizes that Mr. Ivie did not have any control over going off his medications, 
and that he turned to drugs and alcohol in an attempt to manage his mental health 
issues after being forced off his medications for over two weeks. The information also 
highlights that Mr. Ivie could and would succeed on probation if he were allowed the 
chance to have uninterrupted mental health treatment and medication. Thus, in view of 
the new and additional information presented with the Rule 35 motions, Mr. Ivie's 
sentences are excessive. The district court abused its discretion when it denied the 
Rule 35 motions. 
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D. Alternatively, The District Court Abused Its Discretion Because The Denial Of 
Mr. Ivie's Request For An Extension Of Time To Pay The Balances Owed Was 
Not Predicated On Sound Reasoning 
Alternatively, Mr. Ivie submits that the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied the Rule 35 motions, because the denial of his request for an extension of time 
to pay the balances owed was not predicated on sound reasoning. As discussed 
above, "On appeal an abuse of discretion may be found if the trial court ... did not 
reach its decision by an exercise of reason." Izaguirre, 145 Idaho at 822-23. "If the trial 
court acted irrationally, an abuse of discretion will be found." Id. 
As discussed above, in the 2009 case, Mr. Ivie had a balance due of $1916.44. 
(R., p.281.) In the 2011 case, Mr. Ivie had a balance due of $755.34. (R., p.493.) The 
affidavits submitted by the district court clerk advised that, if the balances owed were 
not paid in full one month from the date of the affidavits, "pursuant to statute, a 
collection agency will seek to collect any unpaid monies and will charge an additional 
33% of the money owed as a collection fee." (R., pp.281, 493.) In the Rule 35 motions, 
Mr. Ivie requested "that the payment of all moneys owed to the court be delayed to a 
time after he has been released on parole, so that he may actually be able to pay those 
moneys." (R., pp.283, 495.) The district court denied the requested extension, because 
Mr. Ivie "has been aware of his obligations for quite some time and the Court will not 
prevent the County from turning his account over to collections at this time." 
(R., pp.287, 499.) 
It cannot be said that the district court's denial of Mr. Ivie's request for an 
extension of time to pay the balances owed was predicated on sound reasoning, see 
Izaguirre, 145 Idaho at 825, because the denial of an extension utterly contradicted the 
district court's earlier recognition of Mr. Ivie's precarious financial situation and inability 
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to pay his financial obligations. Mr. Ivie testified at the evidentiary hearing that he had 
been unable to take care of all of his financial obligations while on probation. 
(Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.29, Ls.2-14.) When Mr. Smith told Mr. Ivie that his wife could not 
be the payee for his Social Security benefits, the probation officer took away Mr. Ivie's 
sole source of income. (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.33, Ls.5-25.) 
At the evidentiary hearing, the district court recognized Mr. Ivie's precarious 
financial situation and inability to pay his financial obligations. With regard to the 
alleged failure to pay Mr. Ivie's cost of supervision fees, the district court stated that 
"obviously probation fees is tied into the whole issue of income. Did he, in fact, fail to 
pay the supervision fees? Yes. Are there substantial justifications for not doing so? 
Yes. So I don't find that that's a willful violation." (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.44, Ls.17-21.) 
Similarly, with regard to the alleged failure to take urinalysis tests, while the district court 
found that while Mr. Ivie failed to take them, 'The justification was he couldn't afford to 
pay for them. So it's again one of those two-edged swords. I don't find that that's a 
willful violation, given the circumstances of this case." (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.45, L.23 -
p.46, L.3.) By finding that those violations were non-willful, the district court essentially 
decided Mr. Ivie had no control over his failure to pay because of his precarious 
financial situation. See Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 441; Lafferty, 125 Idaho at 380, 382. 
The district court's denial of the request for an extension to pay the balances 
owed utterly contradicts the district court's earlier recognition of Mr. Ivie's precarious 
financial situation and inability to pay his financial obligations, because Mr. Ivie is unable 
to pay the balances owed while he is in prison. As mentioned above, Mr. Ivie requested 
"that the payment of all moneys owed to the court be delayed to a time after he has 
been released on parole, so that he may actually be able to pay those moneys." 
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(R., pp.283, 495.) Mr. Ivie thereby implied that he would be unable to pay the balances 
owed while he is incarcerated. (See R., pp.283, 495.) 
Thus, the district court's denial of the request for an extension of time for Mr. Ivie 
to pay the balances owed directly contradicts the district court's earlier recognition of 
Mr. Ivie's precarious financial situation, and ignores Mr. Ivie's inability to pay while he is 
in prison. Considering the district court found that Mr. Ivie's failure to pay the $25.00 
monthly cost of supervision fees was non-willful, thanks to Mr. Ivie's "substantial 
justifications for not doing so" (Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.15, Ls.8-20, p.44, Ls.17-21), it is 
irrational for the district court to subsequently deny an extension of time for Mr. Ivie to 
pay the far greater respective balances owed of $1916.44 and $755.34. The district 
court's purported basis for the denial, that Mr. Ivie "has been aware of his obligations for 
quite some time ... " (R., pp.287, 499), is immaterial because Mr. Ivie was aware of his 
unpaid financial obligations while on probation, and the district court still found he had 
substantial justifications for not paying his cost of supervision and urinalysis test 
obligations. (See Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.33, L.5 - p.35, L.4, p.44, Ls.17-21, p.45, L.23 -
p.46, L.3.) 
Mr. Ivie's financial situation remains precarious, and he will be unable to pay the 
balances owed while he is incarcerated. Even worse for Mr. Ivie, the balances owed 
were set to climb much higher upon being turned over to collections, with a 33% 
increase in the amounts due. (See R., pp.281, 493.) This looming 33% increase in the 
balances owed, in light of Mr. Ivie's precarious financial situation and continued inability 
to pay, further demonstrates that the district court's denial of the request for an 
extension is totally contrary to its earlier acknowledgement of Mr. Ivie's dire financial 
circumstances. 
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Thus, it cannot be said that the district court's denial of Mr. Ivie's request for an 
extension of time to pay the balances owed was predicated on sound reasoning, 
because the denial of an extension utterly contradicted the district court's earlier 
recognition of Mr. Ivie's precarious financial situation and inability to pay his financial 
obligations. The district court abused its discretion when it denied the request for an 
extension of time to pay the balances owed. 
The district court's denial of the request for an extension to pay the balances 
owed also represents an abuse of discretion because it interferes with Mr. Ivie's 
rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is one of the four sentencing criteria. E.g., State v. 
Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997). Idaho's appellate courts have recognized that 
requiring a defendant to pay for his financial obligations will "facilitate rehabilitation by 
confronting him with the consequences of his criminal conduct and forcing him to accept 
financial responsibility." State v. Jeffs, 140 Idaho 466, 469 (Ct. App. 2004); see State v. 
McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 807 (2004). However, requiring Mr. Ivie to pay the full amount 
of the balances owed while he is in a precarious financial situation and unable to pay, 
and then allowing the balances owed to rise by 33% after Mr. Ivie does not pay the full 
amount and collection fees are added, actually works against his rehabilitation. Rather 
than "confronting [Mr. Ivie] with the consequences of his criminal conduct," see Jeffs, 
140 Idaho at 469, the collection fees, through increasing the balances owed by 33%, 
only penalize Mr. Ivie for being too poor to immediately pay the balances owed. 
Further, once Mr. Ivie is released from prison, he will likely be on a fixed income 
of Social Security benefits due to his mental health issues and other challenges. 
Considering Mr. Ivie was unable to meet all of his financial obligations on his fixed 
income while he was on probation (see Tr., Feb. 15, 2013, p.29, Ls.2-14), the additional 
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burden of the 33% collection fees will worsen his already-precarious financial situation 
and thereby hinder his efforts to rejoin society. As Ms. Hunt observed, "the fewer 
stressors [Mr. Ivie] encounters during the relearning phase the better chance he will 
have to maintain his recovery from substance use and obtain mental/emotional 
stability." (Confidential Exs., p.6 (emphasis in original).) The collection fees would be 
another stressor, and thereby lower Mr. Ivie's chances of maintaining his recovery. 
Thus, the denial of Mr. Ivie's request for an extension of time to pay the balances owed, 
because it allows for the imposition of collection fees increasing the balances owed by 
33%, interferes with his rehabilitation. 
It cannot be said that the district court's denial of Mr. Ivie's request for an 
extension of time to pay the balances owed was predicated on sound reasoning, 
because the denial of an extension utterly contradicted the district court's earlier 
recognition of Mr. Ivie's precarious financial situation and inability to pay his financial 
obligations. The denial of the request for an extension of time also interferes with 
Mr. Ivie's rehabilitation. Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it denied the 
Rule 35 motions, because the denial of Mr. Ivie's request for an extension of time to pay 
the balances owed was not predicated on sound reasoning. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Ivie respectfully requests that this Court reduce his 
sentences as it deems appropriate. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that his 
cases be remanded to the district court for a new probation violation hearing. 
Alternatively, he respectfully requests that that the district court's orders denying his 
Rule 35 motions be vacated and the cases remanded to the district court for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this 14th day of January, 2014. 
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B EN P. MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defen er 
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